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The 1995 publication of Professor Martin Friedland’s seminal study A  Place 
Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Canada1 makes it unnecessary 
to engage in a lengthy discussion about the increasing public interest in how 
judicial conduct is dealt with in Canada. I therefore commence with a brief review 
of the constitutional framework within which the Canadian judiciary operates and 
will then embark on a detailed discussion of how complaints against judges are 
dealt with, and what steps the Canadian judiciary is taking in response to these 
new modern-day pressures.
A free and independent judiciary is recognized as one of the essential 
hallmarks of a democratic society. Only if the third branch of government is free 
from the two other branches (and I would add in our current society free from 
undue influence from any source) can we say that we live in a society where the 
rule of law is able to flourish.
There are three constitutional sources for judicial independence. The first is 
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 which states that Canada “desires... a 
constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.” The second is 
Part VII of the Constitution Act, 1867 itself and, thirdly, section 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) which guarantees to any 
person charged with a criminal offence the right “to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law... by an independent and impartial tribunal.” This 
is consistent with the requirements of the rule of law which mandates “impartial 
and disinterested umpires”.2
As Chief Justice Lamer put it in R. v. Lippe:
The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure a 
reasonable perception of impartiality; judicial independence is but a “means” to 
an end. If judges could be perceived as “impartial” without judicial 
“independence”, the requirement of independence would be unnecessary. 
However, judicial independence is critical to the public's perception of 
impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary prerequisite for judicial 
impartiality.3
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It is this impartiality which is the true guarantee of judicial independence. 
Independence provides the conditions for impartiality, and public confidence in this 
impartiality is what ultimately guarantees judicial independence. As Sir Ninian 
Stephen put the point:
What ultimately protects the independence of the judiciary is a community 
consensus that the independence is a quality worth protecting, the citizen being 
better served if the judiciary is preserved from domination by those more overtly 
powerful elements of government, on whose support the judiciary is dependent, yet 
whose exercise of power the judiciary is charged with keeping within bounds 
prescribed by law.4
There are two kinds of judicial independence: institutional and individual. 
Institutional independence can best be summed up as “judicial control over the 
administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the 
judicial function.”5 Individual independence, on the other hand, which includes 
security of tenure and financial security, “connotes not merely a state of mind or 
attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to 
others, particularly to the executive branch of government, that rests on objective 
conditions or guarantees.”6 It is this aspect of judicial independence and the 
inevitable (and I say healthy) tension between it and accountability that forms the 
broad background for this paper. The discipline process must never be permitted 
to intrude on the decision-making process.
One other introductory point needs to be made. Assessing and dealing with 
allegations of judicial misconduct is but one area of judicial accountability. To 
name but a few others, having a respectable and consistent judicial appointments 
and elevations process is, many would argue, the very best way to ensure 
accountability. There is, as Professor Friedland points out, an obvious connection 
between the quality of appointments and judicial conduct. Continuing judicial 
education is another example that helps ensure that judges are not only technically 
competent, but well-suited to perform our task in the social context of current 
realities.
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Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been the 
complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them: no 
outsider -  be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge -  should interfere 
in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes 
his or her decision.
But most importantly, all judges adjudicate in public and, with the exception 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, are subject to an appeal process. Accountability 
for the correctness or validity of our decisions is a key aspect of the judicial 
system. Our decisions are subject to ongoing review and debate by brother and 
sister judges, the academic community and the media. Judges cannot decide as 
they choose. We are bound by rules of procedure, and by precedent. Despite the 
confidentiality inherent within the judging process itself, few public institutions in 
our society are subject to such profound public scrutiny in terms of the “quality” 
of our work as is the Canadian judiciary.
The Current Federal Judicial Conduct Process
Now to judicial conduct. I shall concentrate in this paper on the discipline process 
respecting federally-appointed judges because this is what I am most familiar with. 
There is also a process in place in each province with respect to provincially- 
appointed judges which as we shall see, in most jurisdictions, varies considerably 
from that of federally-appointed judges.
The Canadian Judicial Council was established in 1971 to provide a national 
forum for the judiciary to promote and develop educational programs and to deal 
with judicial conduct. Currently, provisions respecting the establishment and 
authority of the Council can be found in Part II of the Judges Act, R.S.C., c. J-l. 
As section 60(1) states: “The objects of the Council are to promote efficiency and 
uniformity, and to improve the quality of the judicial service, in superior courts 
and in the Tax Court of Canada.” Sections 63 to 65 deal with inquiries concerning 
judges.
The Judicial Council consists of the chief justice and associate chief justices of 
each superior court or division thereof in each province of Canada and the 
Territories, together with the chief judge and associate chief judge of the Tax 
Court of Canada. It is chaired by the Chief Justice of Canada.
Like the majority of such institutions, the Council performs most of its work 
through committees. One of these is the Judicial Conduct Committee which 
consists of members of the Executive Committee. Pursuant to the Council’s by­
laws which were significantly altered in 1992 to introduce greater procedural 
fairness, and in light of the provisions of the Charter, the Judicial Conduct 
Committee acts for the full Council at the initial stages of the complaint process.
Unlike many American jurisdictions, there is no formal procedure required 
with respect to a complaint. Once a complaint is received, the Executive Director 
of the Council directs the “complaint” or “allegation” to the chair or one of the 
two vice-chairs of the Committee. The chair, after consideration, may close the
file without seeking comments from the judge or the judge’s Chief Justice. This 
will occur only if “the matter is trivial, vexatious or without substance.” 
Otherwise, comments will usually be requested from the judge complained about 
and his/her Chief Justice.
At this stage, with or without further inquiries having been conducted, the file 
will either be closed if “the matter is without substance or where the conduct 
clearly is not serious enough to warrant removal” or it will be referred to a panel 
normally consisting of three members of the Committee. Members of the panel 
upon further inquiries and with outside assistance, if deemed appropriate, will then 
examine the matter to consider whether a formal investigation by an inquiry 
committee may be warranted under section 63(2) of the Judges Act, or whether the 
complaint file should be closed. If the former, the full Council (minus the 
members of the Committee and up to five other members of Council “set aside” 
should an inquiry committee be established) as a matter of policy will decide 
whether a formal hearing will take place.
If an inquiry committee is established pursuant to the Act, three members of 
Council will normally be designated to “investigate” the matter. In addition the 
Minister of Justice, pursuant to section 63(3) of the^4cf, may make appointments 
to the committee. The “investigation” in reality consists of a full hearing where 
all of the rules of procedural fairness and fundamental justice come into play.
The investigation committee has a discretion whether its proceedings should 
be held in public or in private — unless the Minister requires that they be held in 
public. When the inquiry committee has completed its work it reports its 
conclusions to Council. If Council's opinion is that the judge in question has 
“become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution of the office of judge” 
by reason of the matters set forth in section 65(2) of the^lcf (generally misconduct 
or failure in the due execution of the office), Council may recommend that the 
judge be removed. This is the only formal power given to the Judicial Council 
under the Judges Act. Pursuant to precedent and the provisions of the Constitution 
Act, a joint address of the Senate and House of Commons is then required to 
remove the judge from office.
Despite the absence of a reprimand power in the Act, on a number of 
occasions in recent years a panel, having recommended that a complaint not 
proceed to an inquiry, has communicated an “informal expression of disapproval” 
to the judge in question. This can occur in instances where the panel was of the 
view that, although it did not warrant removal proceedings, the judge’s conduct 
was serious enough to merit criticism.
The number of complaint files opened and the total caseload of Council has 
increased significantly, especially in the last five years. In the fiscal year ended
March 31, 1995, 174 new complaint files were opened, and for the first eleven 
months of the current fiscal year this number stands at 179. You might be 
interested to know that Council has received 85 letters with respect to Mr. Justice 
Bienvenue — which count as one complaint.
I recognize at once that one complaint about a judge s conduct is one 
complaint too many, but we do not live in a perfect world. There are almost 1000 
federally-appointed judges (active and supernumerary) across this country 
performing their task faithfully, effectively and in relative obscurity. Despite the 
increase in relative numbers of complaints (and as earlier mentioned every 
allegation is categorized as a “complaint”), the level of complaints is nowhere near 
that against American state judges.
The majority of complaints about judicial conduct are what we call “disguised 
notices of appeal”. In other words, upon examination, it becomes readily apparent 
that the complaint is not with the judge, but with the result. There is of course 
an appeal process for these unhappy litigants. These are the kind of cases that are 
resolved at the first stage.
In the fiscal year 1994-95, 9 of the 174 complaints were referred to a panel. 
During the past few years there have been two inquiries, both of which have been 
held in public, namely, the Marshall and Gratton inquiries. The Bienvenue inquiry 
is afcr* being held in public. Pursuant to section 63(1) of the Act, Council is 
obliged to hold an inquiry when requested to do so by the federal or a provincial 
Minister of Justice (Attorney General). Both Marshall and Bienvenue are in this 
category, Gratton was conducted on Council’s own initiative pursuant to section 
63(2) of the Act. In the Marshall, Gratton and Bienvenue inquiries the federal 
Minister of Justice, as he is permitted to do under section 63(3) of the Act, 
designated two lawyers as members of the inquiry committee.
How does it all work? Like any complex system it has its imperfections and, 
as I am about to discuss, Council has undertaken a major initiative in this regard. 
But to answer my own question, I can do no better than to quote Professor 
Friedland who, after being given full access to Council s complaint files, stated.
My overall opinion is that the Judicial Conduct Committee and the Executive 
Director have dealt with the matters received carefully and conscientiously. I 
never sensed that any matter was being “covered up” by the Council after a 
complaint was made to it. The descriptions in the Annual Report — at least for 
the past few years -  in my view appear accurately to reflect the complaints that 
have been received by the Council.7
Other Jurisdictions
As noted earlier, most provincial jurisdictions do things somewhat differently. 
Under the new Ontario Courts o f Justice Act for example the Ontario Judicial 
Council consists of an equal number of judges and non-judicial persons with the 
Chief Justice of Ontario, in the event of a tie, having a tie-breaking casting vote. 
Half the members of a panel established to deal with a complaint must be non­
judges.
The Ontario Council has very significant powers. For example the Chief 
Judge, representing the judges, may initiate and prepare a judicial performance or 
evaluation program and may establish standards of conduct for the judges, but 
these programs can only be implemented after approval of Council. The judges 
are obliged to establish a continuing education program, but again it may only be 
implemented when approved by Council. Hearings are presumptively open to the 
public. Mediation is encouraged unless there is a significant power imbalance 
between the complainant and the judge. Thus in terms of both the mandate of the 
Council and the scope and composition of the Council itself there are stark 
differences between it and the federal Judicial Council.
Perhaps the most significant difference relates to the powers given to Council 
upon a finding of judicial misconduct. As noted earlier, under the Constitution Act 
the only statutory power is removal by a joint address of the Senate and House of 
Commons upon a recommendation by the Judicial Council. In all provincial 
jurisdictions their respective Judicial Council is given a wider range of disciplinary 
options extending from a simple warning, through reprimand, suspension and, 
ultimately, removal.
A similar dichotomy exists in the United States. While for each state and the 
federal judiciary there is a formal judicial Code of Conduct, the regime is much 
different. For federal judges, who like Canadian judges are appointed, judges 
alone are involved in the process. The process is initiated at the Circuit Court of 
Appeals level which encompasses a number of states. Most state judicial conduct 
procedures are at the opposite end of the spectrum. There are independent 
commissions set up and complaints are facilitated, if not encouraged. In most 
states all levels of sanction up to but not including removal are dealt with by the 
judicial conduct commission, the majority of whom are non-judicial persons.
Council’s Principles of Judicial Conduct Process
This brings me to Council’s current major project to develop a statement of 
principles of judicial conduct. For over twenty years Council — and, since 1979, the 
Canadian Judges Conference -  flirted with the idea of a code of conduct, but 
eventually opted instead to prepare and publish guidelines or commentaries, the
most recent example being the 1991 book Commentaries on Judicial Conduct. But 
things have certainly changed since then.
In 1992, the Canadian Bar Association at its annual meeting in Halifax dealt 
extensively with the issues of judicial independence and accountability. “Who 
Judges the Judges” was a major theme. In early 1993, Council engaged the 
services of Professor Martin Friedland, a well-known and highly-respected law 
professor, to undertake a study of judicial independence and accountability. It 
seemed to us on Council that there was a growing misconception on the part of 
some people that the two terms were incompatible.
Then, in August 1993, the Canadian Bar Association report “Touchstones for 
Change” chaired by then recently-retired Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson 
was published. It contained a chapter recommending amongst other things the 
development of a code of conduct. It also became abundantly clear -  even prior 
to the publication of Professor Friedland’s report -  that the development of a 
code of conduct for the judiciary, and by that I mean both federally and 
provincially-appointed judges, was going to be one of his firm recommendations.
All these factors (and others) resulted in Council realizing that the time had 
come to attempt to develop a draft code (principles) of judicial conduct. Thus it 
was that Council, in the spring of 1995, formed a working group to undertake the 
task. The working group consists of four members of Council, a representative of 
the Canadian Judges Conference, the Executive Director of Council, and Professor 
Tom Cromwell of Dalhousie Law School as our drafting and academic consultant. 
The first task of the working committee (which I happen to chair) was to develop 
a public discussion document which was widely circulated in the fall of 1995. 
While the document speaks for itself, there are a number of points that I think 
deserve special mention.
Firstly, we do not intend (contrary to the initial suggestions in the Canadian 
Bar Association’s “Touchstones” report) that there be a list of prohibited 
behaviour with attached sanctions. Rather the purpose of the code, and this is 
generally the American approach, is to encourage and define acceptable judicial 
conduct, rather than cataloguing misconduct. It is a document that will speak in 
positive tones about how judges should behave as opposed to outlining what we 
should not be doing.
As the document says, “There should be no formal link between the principles 
of judicial conduct and the complaints process of the Canadian Judicial Council.” 
This is the experience and process for the U.S. federally-appointed judiciary, but 
we are not naive enough to think that no reference will be made to these 
principles in the judicial conduct process of Council. The delicate task of 
delineating the fine line between principles of conduct and a catalogue of
misconduct is one of the most difficult and challenging tasks facing the working 
group.
We expect to consult widely and, indeed, have already started to do so. We 
have had one meeting with a special committee formed by the Canadian Bar 
Association and expect to receive significant input as our committee's work and 
drafts begin to move into the public realm. Other interested groups will be 
consulted as well. We have established a liaison with the Provincial Judges 
Association and look forward to a constructive working relationship. It is obvious, 
as Professor Friedland points out, that a well-developed and widely-accepted Code 
of Conduct for the federal judiciary will have a significant influence on all 
members of the judiciary in Canada -  by whomever appointed.
In terms of content and organization, a tentative list of subjects has been 
drawn up as follows:
(a) integrity and independence;
(b) avoiding impropriety and appearance of impropriety;
(c) diligence and impartial discharge of duties;
(d) minimizing risk of conflict; and
(e) refraining from political activity.
In terms of organization and style, we have been heavily influenced by the 
approach taken in the U.S. federal code, with its organization into a statement of 
principles and expansive commentary. In addition, however, we are attempting to 
develop a number of specific examples for each topic so as to maximize the 
practical benefit to the public and the Canadian judiciary without at the same time 
being either exhaustive or dogmatic.
Perhaps I can illustrate the complexity of the task by mentioning just a few of 
the day-to-day problems that must be addressed in any comprehensive statement 
of principles:
(a) Everyone in this room will be aware of the very recent controversy that has 
arisen in Ontario respecting the proposed cutbacks by the government within the 
courts division and the highly public response thereto by the “three Chiefs”. Was 
this an appropriate thing to do? Mr. Justice Sopinka, who recently revisited his 
“must a judge be a monk” theme, would likely think so. Claire Hoy, a well-known 
Canadian journalist, is strongly of the view that it was not. Who is right? Is there 
any difference between the “Chiefs” writing the letter as opposed to a puisne 
judge? Does it make any difference whether the communication is in public or 
private?
(b) What limits if any should there be on judges making speeches? In the Berger 
inquiry, Council was of the view that judges “should avoid taking part in
controversial political discussion except only in respect of matters that directly 
affect the operations of the courts.” Is this still an appropriate view today? In any 
event, what exactly is “controversial political discussion”?
(c) Generally, to what extent (if at all) are judges’ rights to free speech restricted 
or constrained when we don our judicial robes? In this respect are there any 
limits on a judge’s ability to say what he/she “really thinks” in reasons for 
judgment or otherwise during the course of the court process itself?
(d) Are there any restrictions or constraints on a judge’s private activities? For 
example, to what extent can judges participate in public or charitable activities that 
directly or indirectly involve fund-raising? Would it be appropriate for a judge to 
make a presentation to an outstanding volunteer as part of a fund-raising activity 
for a well-known and highly-respected charitable institution?
(e) What duty or obligation is there upon a judge to ensure as best one can that 
lawyers, witnesses and court staff behave appropriately and in a non-discriminatory 
manner? The model U.S. state Code prescribes a positive duty on the part of 
judges in these circumstances although this has not been adopted by the majority 
of U.S. states. The federal Code on the other hand contains no such specific 
obligation.
(f) The U.S. state Codes for the most part prescribe disqualification on the 
“perception of bias” principle. The U.S. federal Code on the other hand has 
adopted the de minimis rule, i.e. one share owned directly or indirectly in the most 
widely-held of public corporations would disqualify a judge from being involved in 
any aspect of litigation respecting that corporation, no matter how trivial. Is either 
appropriate for Canada? Does it make any difference if the judge has a discussion 
on or off the record with counsel and obtains their permission for him/her to 
continue.
These are just examples of the difficult task ahead for us.
How are we doing? We are certainly hard at it. Since getting under way in 
the summer of 1995 we have had two extensive committee meetings and have held 
monthly conference calls in an effort to move the project along. We have finished 
drafting our first document (on political activity), and I expect that by the time this 
paper is published the document will be public. We had intended to wait and 
release it as part of the omnibus chapter on off-the-bench activity (impartiality), 
but decided to move the time-table ahead. We are doing this because of our 
perception that the task before us may well not be completed within the original 
year-and-a-half/two year time span anticipated when the project was undertaken. 
In addition, as one would expect within such a diverse group of independently- 
minded individuals, the judiciary is by no means unanimous in their endorsement
of the principles of judicial conduct project. The sooner everyone has an 
opportunity to see a sample of what we are working on, the better.
I look forward to your help in ensuring that the project will be a success.
